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Fear of the Market or Fear of the Competitor? Ambiguity
in a Real Options Game
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Jacco J.J. Thijssen
The York Management School, University of York, United Kingdom, jacco.thijssen@york.ac.uk
In this paper we study an investment game between two firms with a first–mover advantage, where payoffs are driven by a
geometric Brownian motion. At least one of the firms is assumed to be ambiguous over the drift, with maxmin preferences
over a strongly rectangular set of priors. We develop a strategy and equilibrium concept allowing for ambiguity and show
that equilibria can be preemptive (a firm invests at a point where investment is Pareto dominated by waiting) or sequential
(one firm invests as if it were the exogenously appointed leader). Following the standard literature, the worst–case prior
for an ambiguous firm in the follower role is obtained by setting the lowest possible trend in the set of priors. However,
if an ambiguous firm is the first mover, then the worst–case drift can fluctuate between the lowest and the highest trends.
This novel result shows that “worst–case prior” in a setting with drift ambiguity does not always equate to “lowest trend”.
As a consequence, preemptive pressure reduces. We show that this results in the possibility of firm value being increasing
in the level of ambiguity. If only one firm is ambiguous, then the value of the non–ambiguous firm can be increasing in
the level of ambiguity of the ambiguous firm.
Key words: Real Options, Knightian Uncertainty, Worst–Case Prior, Optimal Stopping, Timing Game
1. Introduction
Many, if not most, investment decisions taken by firms are characterized by substantial upfront sunk costs,
(partial) irreversibility, and uncertainty over future cash flows (cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). As has been
well–recognized since Knight (1921), the uncertainty over future cash flows can seldom be captured by a
unique probability measure; there is usually ambiguity over the correct probability measure. For example,
when firms are contemplating entering a new market, or introducing a new technology, there is typically no
historical data available from which the distribution of future demand can be inferred. Instead, managers
1
have to rely on market research, expert opinion, etc., to gauge likely future demand for their products. This
variety of opinion results in a set of probability distributions over future events, which may not easily be
condensed into a single distribution. Therefore, managers need a theory of valuation of investment projects
under ambiguity. In this paper paper we provide such a theory for the case where competing firms have a
similar investment option, thereby adding a strategic dimension to the ambiguous business environment.
The effect of ambiguity on decision making has been studied extensively, most famously by Ellsberg
(1961). The overwhelming conclusion of the experimental literature is that decision makers are ambiguity
averse. The classical Ellsberg experiment uses two urns, both with 100 red or blue balls. For the first urn
it is known that half the balls are red. For the second urn no such information is available. Most people
prefer bets on the first urn with comparable bets on the second urn. This observation violates Savage’s
“sure thing principle”; in fact, it calls into doubt “a basic tenet of Bayesianism, namely, that all uncertainty
can be expressed in a probabilistic way. Exhibiting preferences for known versus unknown probabilities is
incompatible with this tenet” (Gilboa (2009, p. 134)).
The Ellsberg paradox is not really a paradox, because it does not result from a cognitive bias, but, rather,
from lack of information. It is perfectly possible for decision makers to make consistent decisions under
ambiguity. This has been shown by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), who incorporate an ambiguity aversion
axiom into the subjective expected utility framework. They then show that a rational decision maker acts
as if she maximizes expected utility over the worst–case prior within a (subjectively chosen) set of priors.
Ambiguity models have been successful in the finance literature to explain phenomena such as selective
participation, under–diversification, and portfolio inertia (see Epstein and Schneider (2010)).
In the corporate environment, ambiguity may arise in several contexts. For example, a firm’s management
may be considering introducing a new technology to the market, so that there might not be any relevant
historical data that can guide decision making. Instead, management may have to rely on expert opinion. It is
well–documented that expert opinion can wildly vary in such cases (see, e.g., Ball and Watt (2013)). It is still
possible, of course, for management to act in a Bayesian way and construct a single prior from such varying
opinions and there is a literature that provides ways of doing so (see, e.g., Gzyl et al. (2017)). However, it
has been suggested in the risk management literature (see, e.g., Randall (2011)) that in cases where risks
are not easy to reduce to a single probability measure managers should apply a “precautionary principle”.
The multiple prior maxmin utility of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) can be seen as an operationalization of
this idea. It allows the decision maker to pick a “cautious” probability measure from a range of plausible
ones in a way that is consistent with experimentally observed behavior.
In this paper, we use multiple–prior maxmin preferences to analyse investment timing decisions by
ambiguity–averse decision makers in a duopoly. According to our theory, ambiguity aversion reduces pre-
emptive pressure. In addition, firm value under ambiguity aversion can actually be increasing in ambiguity.
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In addition, the value of an unambiguous firm can be increasing in the degree of ambiguity of an ambiguity
averse firm. Hence, a firm that is not ambiguity averse benefits from its rival’s ambiguity aversion.
Our theory stays close to the real options literature (cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994)), the most important
prediction of which (i.e. that higher volatility leads to later investment) is validated empirically; see, e.g.,
Bloom et al. (2007) and Bloom (2009), and references therein. In addition, a major survey reported in
Graham and Harvey (2001) concludes that the real options approach is fairly popular among managers as a
tool for investment appraisal.
In the real options literature it is common to assume that future cash flows evolve according to a
(continuous–time) stochastic process, where cash flows grow at an expected rate augmented with shocks
that follow a random walk. Incorporating ambiguity in such a setting is typically done by assuming that
at any time t the expected growth rate is not known, but can take any value in a given set (this is referred
to as drift ambiguity). The worst case in a monopolistic model is induced by the lowest possible expected
growth rate (Nishimura and Ozaki (2007)). So, in the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) framework applied to
investment timing problems, the presence of drift ambiguity leads the firm to act cautiously: by considering
the lowest possible expected growth rate the firm values future cash flows assuming that nature will act
malevolently. One could interpret this as “fear of the market”.
When firms take investment decisions in a competitive environment, they are not only ambiguous about
future cash flows, but also about the timing of their competitors’ actions. After all, suppose that a firm has
just invested in a new technology to obtain, say, a cost advantage, but that its competitor still has the option
to invest as well. It is natural to assume that investment by the competitor lowers the first adopter’s cash
flows. It is similarly innocuous to assume that the competitor will make its investment decision when it
expects the future cash flows to be high enough. This implies that, in expectation, the competitor will invest
sooner when the expected growth rate of cash flows is higher. This, in turn, means that the worst case for the
first adopter is represented by the earliest possible time, in expectation, that the competitor invests, which is
represented by the highest possible expected growth rate. One can think of this as “fear of the competitor”.
In this paper we investigate how these two diametrically opposed “fears” balance: what is the worst case
at any given time when “fear of the market” suggests the lowest possible expected growth rate, but “fear of
the competitor” suggests the highest possible expected growth rate? It turns out that we can compute the
worst–case prior explicitly: it is either the lowest or the highest expected growth rate. The regions where
each of these worst cases dominates the other can, as we show, be determined exactly.
We make contributions to two strands of literature, the first being the literature on decisions under ambi-
guity. Contrary to the standard literature, in Section 3 we use an analysis based on backward stochastic
differential equations (BSDEs) and g–expectations, as introduced by Peng (1997), to study which of the
two “fears” dominates. It turns out that for small values of the stochastic process, the worst case always
corresponds to the lowest possible trend, whereas for higher values the highest possible trend may represent3
the worst case, depending on the underlying parameters. As a consequence, if firms are symmetric in terms
of the set of priors, but asymmetric in, for example, the sunk costs of investment, then there will be times
where firms use different priors to determine firm value. So, the worst–case prior is not only role–dependent
(first mover or second mover), but also firm–dependent. As we follow the seminal contribution of Chen and
Epstein (2002) this result is obtained under standard modeling assumptions.
Our second contribution is to the literature on real options games. We combine the single–firm ambiguity
model of Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) with a standard real options game without ambiguity as analysed in,
for example, Pawlina and Kort (2006) and Steg (2015, Section 4.1). This allows for a clear analysis of the
consequences of ambiguity on equilibrium investment scenarios and firm value.
In Section 4 we show that equilibria in our game can be of the familiar two types. First, there may be
preemptive equilibria in which both firms are willing to invest at a time where it is not optimal for at least
one firm to do so. This type of equilibrium is familiar from the literature (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1985),
Weeds (2002), and Pawlina and Kort (2006)), but we embed a technique recently developed by Riedel and
Steg (2017) to rigorously prove existence of this type of equilibrium. In particular, we extend their notion
of strategy in such a way that firms are ambiguous about when action is taken, but not about what those
actions are. This extension allows for close comparisons with the existing literature and ensures that our
results are due to ambiguity only and not to our modeling of strategies.
In a preemptive equilibrium there are subgames where it is known (a.s.) ex ante which firm is going to
invest first. This firm will invest at a point in time where its leader value exceeds its follower value, but
where its competitor is indifferent between the two roles. There are also subgames where firms compete
instantaneously for the leader role. In such subgames, the intensities with which firms try to “win” the
leader role are such that any expected advantage of becoming the leader is competed away; so–called
rent equalization (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985)). Finally, there are subgames where both firms invest
simultaneously.
A second type of equilibrium that can arise is a sequential equilibrium, in which one firm invests at
the same time it would if it knew that the other firm will not preempt. Each game always has at least an
equilibrium of one of these two types, which can not co–exist.
In Section 5 we provide some comparative statics of equilibrium strategies and firm values under various
levels of ambiguity. We are particularly interested in the difference between an increase in ambiguity and a
decrease in the trend in a model with a unique prior. Unlike the real options models analysed in the literature
so far, there are cases in our model where the worst–case prior changes over time. While this does not
change the types of equilibria that can be obtained, it does have an impact on the prevailing equilibrium
for given parameterizations. We show that the preemption region in our model with symmetric ambiguity
is always contained in the preemption region that one would obtain in a model under a unique prior with
the lowest possible trend. This makes it more likely, in our model, that a sequential equilibrium emerges,
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rather than a preemptive one. So, ambiguity can reduce preemptive pressure. As we will show below, this
is beneficial to the firm with the lower sunk costs of investment. In fact, we show that, counter–intuitively,
this firm’s equilibrium value may actually be increasing in ambiguity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our model of a real options
game under ambiguity. The value functions of the different roles in this game are derived in Section 3.3,
after which these functions are used to determine equilibria in Section 4. A numerical analysis of our model
is given in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss some of our modeling assumptions and possible extensions.
We also provide a historic case to illustrate the applicability of the theory presented in this paper.
2. The Model
We follow Pawlina and Kort (2006) in considering two firms that are competing, for example to enter a
new market. Uncertainty in the market is modeled on a (reference) probability space (Ω,F ,P) through a
geometric Brownian motion X = (Xt)t≥0 that solves the stochastic differential equation
dXt= µXtdt+σXtdBt, (1)
where (Bt)t≥0 is a Wiener process, and µ∈R and σ > 0 are fixed parameters such that X admits a unique
strong solution. Information is modeled by the P–augmented filtration (Ft)t≥0 generated by X . The sunk
costs of investment are firm specific and given by Ii > 0, i= 1,2.
The payoff streams (or cash flows) are given by processes (DkℓXt)t≥0, where Dkℓ, k, ℓ= 0,1, denotes a
scaling factor if the firm’s investment status is k (k= 0 if the firm has not invested and k= 1 if the firm has
invested) and the investment status of the competitor is ℓ ∈ {0,1}. It is assumed that D10 >D11 ≥D00 ≥
D01 ≥ 0, and that there is a first mover advantage, i.e. D10 −D00 >D11−D01. In this paper we consider
symmetric revenues, although the values for the Dkℓs could easily be made firm–specific at the cost of more
cumbersome notation. We provide a discussion of these assumptions in Section 6.
We assume that at least one firm is assumed to be ambiguous about the measure P. Following the recent
literature on drift ambiguity in continuous time, we model the priors that firm i, i = 1,2, considers using
a set of density generators Θi. The resulting set of probability measures that constitutes the firm’s set of
priors is denoted by PΘi . A process (θt)t≥0 is a density generator if the process (M θt )t≥0, with
dM θt =−θtM
θ
t dBt, M
θ
0 = 1, (2)
is a P–martingale. Such a process (θt)t≥0 generates a new measure Q via the Radon–Nikodym derivative
dQ/dP=M θ∞. While we assume that both firms use the same reference prior P, the set of density generators
can differ between firms. 5
Under some regularity conditions (see Chen and Epstein (2002)), the set of density generators is defined
as
Θi :=
{
(θt)t≥0
∣∣ θt(ω)∈Θi,t(ω), dP–a.e., all t≥ 0} ,
and the resulting set of measures PΘi is called strongly rectangular. For sets of strongly–rectangular priors
is has been shown that (Chen and Epstein (2002)):
1. P∈PΘi ;
2. all measures in PΘi are uniformly absolutely continuous with respect to P and are equivalent to P;
3. for every ξ ∈L 2(Ω,F ,P), there exists P∗i ∈PΘi such that for all t≥ 0,
EP
∗
i [ξ|Ft] = inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ[ξ|Ft]. (3)
The measure P∗i above is called the worst–case prior and is generated by a specific density generator called
the upper–rim generator, which is denoted by θ∗i = (θ∗i,t)t≥0. Note that the worst–case prior is payoff and
player–specific.
For a given density generator θ ∈ Θi it follows immediately from Girsanov’s theorem, that under the
measure Q generated by θ, the process (Bθt )t≥0, defined by
Bθt =Bt+
∫ t
0
θsds,
is a Q–Brownian motion and that, under Q, the process X follows the diffusion
dXt = (µ−σθt)Xtdt+σXtdB
θ
t .
In the remainder we will assume that Θi,t = [−κi, κi], for all t ≥ 0, for some κi ≥ 0. Denote ∆i =
[µ
i
, µi] = [µ− σκi, µ+ σκi]. This form of ambiguity is called κ–ignorance (cf. Chen and Epstein (2002)),
and its advantage is that Θi is strongly rectangular so that the results stated above apply. Note that, if κi= 0,
it holds that P∗i = P. Note that κ–ignorance does not allow for learning; we will discuss the impact of this
assumption in Section 6.
Both firms are assumed to be ambiguity averse in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), i.e., they
maximise expected profits over the worst–case prior. Such preferences are typically called muliptle–prior
maxmin. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) axiomatize such preferences in a static model, by relaxing some of
the Savage axioms of subjective expected utility. An axiomatization for a dynamic setting (in discrete time)
is pursued in Epstein and Schneider (2003). Our set up is, in essence, a continuous–time limit of the Epstein
and Schneider (2003) model; see also Chen and Epstein (2002).
In the remainder, a special role is played by the density generator θ−κi with θ−κit =−κi for all t≥ 0. The
measure that is generated by θ−κi is denoted by P−κi . Under P−κi it immediately follows that X follows
a GBM with trend µ
i
and volatility σ. In fact, in the literature on κ–ambiguity in real options models it
typically holds that θ∗i = θ−κi. We will see that in our model, there are payoff streams for which θ∗i 6= θ−κi .
Finally, the discount rate is assumed to be r >max{µ1, µ2} and to apply to both firms.6
3. Value Functions of Firm Roles
In a timing game with two firms, each firm can play one of three roles. Firm i becomes the leader at time t
if it is the first firm to invest at that time. The firm becomes the follower at time t if its competitor is the first
to invest at that time. Finally, firm i becomes a simultaneous investor at time t if both firms invest at that
time. In equilibrium, a careful balancing of the payoffs accruing from these roles is required. In this section
we therefore derive the value functions of these different roles. It turns out that the derivation of the leader
value in particular is of interest in its own right. In the following, we denote firm i’s worst–case priors of
the leader, follower and simultaneous investment values by P∗L,i, P
∗
F,i and P
∗
M,i, respectively.
3.1. The follower value
Assume that firm j, j = 1,2, becomes the leader at time t ≥ 0. Then firm i, i 6= j, becomes the follower
at that time. Firm i determines its time to invest by maximizing its value. This is achieved by solving the
optimal stopping problem
Fi(xt) := sup
τF
i
≥t
inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[∫ τFi
t
e−r(s−t)D01Xsds+
∫ ∞
τF
i
e−r(s−t)(D11Xs− rIi)ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
. (4)
The solution to this problem is called the follower value.
If the set of priors PΘi is strongly rectangular, it turns out that problem (4) can be reduced to a standard
optimal stopping problem and, hence, can be solved using standard techniques. This reduction is possible
due to the following lemma, the proof of which is standard (cf. Nishimura and Ozaki (2007)) and is, thus,
omitted.
Lemma 1 Let PΘi be strongly–rectangular. Then
Fi(xt) = sup
τF
i
≥t
EP
∗
F,i
[∫ τFi
t
e−r(s−t)D01Xsds+
∫ ∞
τF
i
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds− e
−r(τFi −t)Ii
∣∣∣Ft
]
, (5)
where P∗F,i=P
−κi
.
Hence, for the follower problem of firm i, the worst case is always induced by the lowest possible drift µ
i
.
This observation makes sense, because the actions of the leader have no influence on the decision of the
follower once the leader has invested. The problem therefore reduces to one of a “monopolistic” decision
maker. In the language of the introduction, the follower is only exposed to “fear of the market” and not to
“fear of the competitor.”
Applying standard techniques (see, e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994)), we find that the follower value can
be expressed as
Fi(xt) =


D01xt
r−µ
i
+
(
D11−D01
r−µ
i
xFi − Ii
)(
xt
xF
i
)β1(µi) if xt <xFi
D11xt
r−µ
i
− Ii if xt ≥ xFi ,
(6)
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where xFi is the investment trigger of firm i, i.e., the value of the process X , which, once crossed from
below, makes investment (rather than waiting) the optimal decision. In this case
xFi =
β1(µi)
β1(µi)− 1
r−µ
i
D11−D01
Ii,
and β1(µ)> 1 is the positive root of the quadratic equation
Q(β;µ)≡
1
2
σ2β(β− 1)+µβ− r= 0. (7)
3.2. The simultaneous investment value
In a similar way one can argue that the upper–rim generator of PΘi for the value of simultaneous invest-
ment, denoted by Mi, satisfies θ∗i = θ−κi . Hence, under the worst–case prior the firm acts as if the trend is
given by µ and therefore that
Mi(xt) : = inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)(D11Xs− rIi)ds
∣∣∣Ft]
=EP
∗
M,i
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)(D11Xs− rIi)ds
∣∣∣Ft]= D11
r−µ
i
xt− Ii,
where P∗M,i =P
−κi
.
3.3. The leader value
The standard techniques for computing value functions are not applicable any longer for determining the
leader value. In our setting one needs to allow for the worst–case drift to change over time. Indeed, we will
see that there are cases where P∗L,i 6= P
−κi
. In such cases there will be times t for which θ∗1,t 6= θ∗2,t, even if
PΘ1 =PΘ2 .
If firm i becomes the leader at time t≥ 0 (implying that firm j follows at the stopping time τFj ), firm i’s
leader value is given by
Li(xt) := inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[∫ τFj
t
e−r(s−t)D10Xsds+
∫ ∞
τF
j
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds
∣∣∣Ft
]
− Ii. (8)
In Theorem 1 below, which describes this leader value, two cases are distinguished. If the difference
D10 −D11 is sufficiently small, we find that the worst case is, as before, always induced by µi. If this
condition is not satisfied, then the worst case is given by µ
i
for small values xt up to a certain threshold
x∗i , where it jumps to µi. The intuition for this fact can already be derived from equation (8): the lowest
trend µ
i
gives the minimal values for the payoff stream (DklXt). However, the higher the trend µ, the
sooner the stopping time τFj is expected to be reached. The higher payoff stream (D10Xt) is then sooner
replaced by the lower one (D11Xt). If the drop in payoffs becomes sufficiently small, the former effect
always dominates the latter. Then the worst case is given by µ
i
for each xt. If the drop in payoffs is large
enough, there may be values xt where the latter effect dominates the former and where the worst–case prior
is induced by µi instead. 8
Theorem 1 The worst case for the leader value function is always given by the lowest possible drift µ
i
(θ∗i = θ−κi) if, and only if, it holds that
D10−D11
D10
≤
1
β1(µi)
. (9)
In this case, the leader value function becomes
Li(xt) =


D10xt
r−µ
i
+
(
xt
xF
j
)β1(µi)
D11−D10
r−µ
i
xFj − Ii if xt <xFj
D11xt
r−µ
i
− Ii if xt ≥ xFj .
(10)
On the other hand, if D10−D11
D10
> 1
β1(µi)
, then there exists a unique threshold x∗i ∈ (0, xFj ) such that µi
is the worst case (θ∗i,t = −κi) on {Xt < x∗i } and µi is the worst case (θ∗i,t = +κi) on {x∗i ≤ Xt < xFj }.
Furthermore, in this case the leader value function is given by
Li(xt) =


D10xt
r−µ
i
− 1
β1(µi)
D10x
∗
i
r−µ
i
(
xt
x∗
i
)β1(µi)
− Ii if xt <x∗i
D10xt
r−µi
+
(x∗i )
β2(µi)x
β1(µi)
t −(x
∗
i )
β1(µi)x
β2(µi)
t
(x∗
i
)β2(µi)(xF
j
)β1(µi)−(x∗
i
)β1(µi)(xF
j
)β2(µi)
(
D11
r−µ
i
− D10
r−µi
)
xFj
+
(xFj )
β1(µi)x
β2(µi)
t −(x
F
j )
β2(µi)x
β1(µi)
t
(x∗
i
)β2(µi)(xF
j
)β1(µi)−(x∗
i
)β1(µi)(xF
j
)β2(µi)
[(
1− 1
β1(µi)
)
D10
r−µ
i
− D10
r−µi
]
x∗i − Ii if x∗i ≤ xt <xFj
D11xt
r−µ
i
− Ii if xt ≥ xFj ,
(11)
where β2(µ)< 0 is the negative root of the quadratic equation Q(β;µ) = 0 (cf. (7)).
Before proving this theorem we point out some of its features and consequences. The value function (10)
is standard in real options models, whereas (11) is not. However, the first part of (11) does look like the
value function one obtains from a standard real options model. Suppose a (non–ambiguous) firm has an
option to exchange the payoff stream (D0Xt)t≥0 for (D1Xt)t≥0, with 0≤D0 <D1, by paying a sunk cost
I . It is well known (cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994)) that the value function in the continuation region (0, x∗)
can then be written as
V (xt) =
D0x
r−µ
+
1
β1(µ)− 1
I
(xt
x∗
)β1(µ)
,
where x∗ denotes the optimal investment trigger. This value function allows for a clear interpretation. If
the firm never invests, then its value is the first term on the right-hand side, which is simply the expected
present–value of receiving the stream (D0Xt)t≥0 forever. This value has to be corrected for the fact that at
x∗ the firm’s value increases due to investment. At that time, it turns out that the firm’s value increases by
a factor I/(β1(µ)− 1). The factor 1/(β1(µ)− 1) results from applying the value–matching and smooth–
pasting optimality conditions at the trigger x∗. That value has to be discounted back to time t, which is
achieved by the expected discount factor
EP
[
e−r(τ
∗−t)
∣∣∣Ft]= (xt
x∗
)β1(µ)
,
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Figure 1 The critical value x∗1 differentiates between two “regimes” for firm 1.
where τ∗ is the first hitting time of x∗.
In our model we have a similar interpretation. If the firm never changes the worst case from µ
i
, then
its present value is D10x/(r− µi). However, this overestimates the firm’s value, because at x
∗
i the worst
case changes and, thus, evaluating revenues under µ
i
forever is too optimistic. At x∗i it turns out that rev-
enues need to be reduced by a factor 1/β1(µi). Like in the option case, this factor is obtained by applying
a smooth–pasting condition, as becomes obvious from the proof below. The expected discount factor dis-
counts this drop in payoffs back to time t.
It is important to highlight that, while the payoff function looks like the value function of an option
exercise decision, our value function does not allow for an option interpretation. The switch at x∗i is entirely
driven by the worst–case prior for the leader value function. It just so happens that smooth pasting results
in similar–looking expressions, but there is no optimality condition being applied here. We also point out
that, while it may appear that the value function for x < x∗i does not depend on µi, in fact it does through
the value of x∗i , which depends on both µi and µi.
The second part of the value function (11) contains the terms
(x∗i )
β2(µi)x
β1(µi)
t − (x
∗
i )
β1(µi)x
β2(µi)
t
(x∗i )
β2(µi)(xFj )
β1(µi)− (x∗i )
β1(µi)(xFj )
β2(µi)
and
(xFj )
β1(µi)x
β2(µi)
t − (x
F
j )
β2(µi)x
β1(µi)
t
(x∗i )
β2(µi)(xFj )
β1(µi)− (x∗i )
β1(µi)(xFj )
β2(µi)
,
which admit a clear interpretation: they represent the expected discount factors of the first hitting times of
(i) firm j’s follower threshold conditional on it being reached before x∗i is reached, and (ii) the threshold x∗i
conditional on it being reached before firm j’s follower threshold is reached, respectively.
Figure 1 depicts the implications of Theorem 1. In case the drop of the payoff from being the only one
who has invested to the situation that both players have invested is sufficiently big, the value x∗ distinguishes
10
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Figure 2 The boundary between the region where µ is always the worst–case trend and the region where it is not. Other
parameters are: r=0.1, µ= 0.04, and I =120.
between the regions where each of the two “fears” dominates. For sufficiently small values of xt, the threat
of the competitor investing is relatively low, so that “fear of the market” dominates. For values of xt close
enough to xFj , the threat of the competitor investing dominates the payoff uncertainty, so that “fear of the
competitor” dominates.
Figure 2 illustrates condition (9) as a function of both volatility (σ) and ambiguity (κ). It can be seen that
the higher the level of κ, the more likely it is that for lower first–mover advantages the worst–case trend is
not always given by µ. In addition, it is also clear that the relationship is not monotonic in σ for higher levels
of κ. This non–monotonicity follows from the non–linear (multiplicative) way in which κ and σ interact in
β1(µ). This feature is, therefore, not peculiar to our particular numerical example and should be expected
more generally. From Figure 2 we conclude that a switch in the worst–case leader value is most likely in
low–volatility, high–ambiguity, and high first–mover advantage environments.
For the proof of Theorem 1, we need a different approach compared to the standard literature on real
option games. We use backward stochastic differential equations and g-expectations as introduced by Peng
(1997). The advantage of this approach lies in the fact that we know the value of our problem at the entry
point of the follower. That value yields the starting point for a BSDE. A non–linear Feynman–Kac formula
then reduces the problem to solving a particular non–linear partial differential equation. From this PDE we
are eventually able to derive the worst–case prior and the value function.
Proof. To keep notation simple, we ignore (without loss of generality) the sunk costs Ii.
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1. Denote
Yt := inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[∫ τFj
t
e−r(s−t)D10Xsds+
∫ ∞
τF
j
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds
∣∣∣Ft
]
.
Applying the time consistency property of a strongly rectangular set of density generators gives
Yt= inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[∫ τFj
t
e−r(s−t)D10Xsds+
∫ ∞
τF
j
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds
∣∣∣Ft
]
= inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[
inf
Q′∈PΘ
EQ
′
[∫ τFj
t
e−r(s−t)D10Xsds+
∫ ∞
τF
j
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds
∣∣∣FτF
j
] ∣∣∣Ft
]
= inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[∫ τFj
t
e−r(s−t)D10Xsds+ e
−r(τFj −t) inf
Q′∈PΘ
EQ
′
[∫ ∞
τF
j
e−r(s−τ
F
j )D11Xsds
∣∣∣FτF
j
] ∣∣∣Ft
]
= inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[∫ τFj
t
e−r(s−t)D10Xsds+ e
−r(τFj −t)Φi(xτF
j
)
∣∣∣Ft
]
,
where
Φi(xt) := inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds
∣∣∣Ft]= D11xt
r−µ
i
. (12)
Chen and Epstein (2002) show that Yt solves the BSDE
−dYt= gi(Zt)dt−ZtdBt, (13)
where, in our case, the generator, gi, is given by
gi(z) =−κi|z| − rYt+XtD10.
It is well-known (cf. Chen and Epstein (2002, Appendix B)) that the upper–rim generator satisfies
θ∗tZt = max
y∈Θi,t
y ·Zt. (14)
This shows that θ∗i,t ∈ {−κ,+κ} for all t≥ 0.
The terminal boundary condition of the BSDE (13) is given by
YτF
j
=Φi(x
F
j ),
In the terminology of Peng (2013), we now say that the leader value is the gi–expectation of the random
variable e−r(τ
F
j −t)Φi(x
F
j ), and write
Yt=Egi
[
e−r(τ
F
j −t)Φi(x
F
j )
∣∣∣Ft] .
2. Denote the present value of the leader payoff by Li, i.e. Li(xt) = Yt. The non–linear Feynman–Kac
formula (Peng (2013, Theorem 3)) implies that Li solves the non–linear PDE
LXLi(x)+ gi(σxL
′
i(x)) = 0,12
where LX is the characteristic operator of the SDE (1). [Note that Peng (1991) shows that the non–linear
Feynman–Kac formula not only holds for deterministic times but also for first exit times like τFj , even if it
does not hold a.s. that {τFj <∞}.]
Hence, Li solves
1
2
σ2x2L′′i (x)+µxL
′
i(x)−κiσx |L
′
i(x)| − rLi(x)+D10x= 0. (15)
Equation (15) implies that µ
i
is the worst case on the set {x≤ xFj |L′i(x)> 0} and µi is the worst case on
{x≤ xFj |L
′
i(x)< 0}.
The unique viscosity solution to the PDE (15) is given by
Li(x) =
D10x
r−µ
+Axβ1(µ)+Bxβ2(µ), (16)
where µ equals either µ
i
or µi. The constants A and B are determined by some boundary conditions.
One can easily see that for x close to zero we have L′i(x) > 0. Now two cases are possible: Either
L′i(x)> 0 for all x∈ [0, xFj ] or we can find (at least) one point x∗i at which L′i(x∗i ) = 0.
3. Let us first assume that L′i(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, xFj ). Then µi is always the worst–case drift. Since
β2(µi)< 0, we have that B = 0. In order to determine the constant A, we apply a value–matching condition
at xFj , i.e.
Li(x
F
j ) =
D10x
F
j
r−µ
i
+A(xFj )
β1(µi) =
D11x
F
j
r−µ
i
.
This implies that
A=
D10−D11
r−µ
i
(xFj )
1−β1(µi),
and therefore that
Li(xt) =
D10xt
r−µ
i
+
(
xt
xFj
)β1(µi) D11−D10
r−µ
i
xFj . (17)
Due to the continuity and concavity of the value function (17), the condition L′i(x)≥ 0 for all x≤ xFj is
equivalent to L′i(xFj )≥ 0. Therefore,
L′i(x
F
j ) =
D10
r−µ
i
+
(
D11−D10
r−µ
i
)
β1(µi)
(
xFj
xFj
)β1(µi)−1
≥ 0
⇐⇒ D11−D10≥−
D10
β1(µi)
⇐⇒
D10−D11
D10
≤
1
β1(µ
i
)
. (18)
4. If inequality (18) is not satisfied, the worst–case drift changes at some point x∗i <xFj from µi to µi, where
x∗i is determined by the condition L′i(x∗i ) = 0. We denote by L˜i(x;µi) the solution to (16) on [0, x∗i ] and by13
Lˆi(x;µi) the solution to (16) on [x∗i , xFj ]. The unknowns in (16) are determined by twice applying a value–
matching condition and once a smooth–pasting condition (see also Cheng and Riedel (2013)). Indeed, it
must hold that
1. Lˆi(xFj ;µi) = Φi(xFj ),
2. L˜i(x∗i ;µi) = Lˆi(x
∗
i ;µi),
3. L˜′i(x∗i ;µi) = Lˆ
′
i(x
∗
i ;µi).
In case µ
i
is not always the worst–case drift, the unique viscosity solution of (16) is given by
Li(xt) = 1xt<x∗i L˜i(xt;µi)+ 1xt≥x
∗
i
Lˆi(xt;µi),
where
L˜i(xt;µi) =
D10xt
r−µ
i
−
1
β1(µi)
D10x
∗
i
r−µ
i
(
xt
x∗i
)β1(µi)
,
and
Lˆi(xt;µi) =
D10xt
r−µi
+
(x∗i )
β2(µi)x
β1(µi)
t − (x
∗
i )
β1(µi)x
β2(µi)
t
(x∗i )
β2(µi)(xFj )
β1(µi)− (x∗i )
β1(µi)(xFj )
β2(µi)
(
D11
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi i
)
xFj
+
(xFj )
β1(µi)x
β2(µi)
t − (x
F
j )
β2(µi)x
β1(µi)
t
(x∗i )
β2(µi)(xFj )
β1(µi)− (x∗i )
β1(µi)(xFj )
β2(µi)
[(
1−
1
β1(µi)
)
D10
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
]
x∗i .
We can easily verify that Lˆi and L˜i satisfy the boundary conditions. Indeed,
Lˆi(x
F
j ;µi) =
D10x
F
j
r−µi
+
(x∗i )
β2(µi)(xFj )
β1(µi)− (x∗i )
β1(µi)(xFj )
β2(µi)
(x∗i )
β2(µi)(xFj )
β1(µi)− (x∗i )
β1(µi)(xFj )
β2(µi)
(
D11
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
)
xFj
+
(xFj )
β1(µi)(xFj )
β2(µi)− (xFj )
β2(µi)(xFj )
β1(µi)
(x∗i )
β2(µi)(xFj )
β1(µi)− (x∗i )
β1(µi)(xFj )
β2(µi)
[(
1−
1
β1(µi)
)
D10
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
]
x∗i
=
D10x
F
j
r−µi
+
(
D11
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
)
xFj =
D11x
F
j
r−µ
i
=Φi(x
F
j ).
and
Lˆi(x
∗
i ;µi) =
D10x
∗
i
r−µi
+
(x∗i )
β2(µi)(x∗i )
β1(µi)− (x∗i )
β1(µi)(x∗i )
β2(µi)
(x∗i )
β2(µi)(xFj )
β1(µi)− (x∗i )
β1(µi)(xFj )
β2(µi)
(
D11
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
)
xFj
+
(xFj )
β1(µi)(x∗i )
β2(µi)− (xFj )
β2(µi)(x∗i )
β1(µi)
(x∗i )
β2(µi)(xFj )
β1(µi)− (x∗i )
β1(µi)(xFj )
β2(µi)
[(
1−
1
β1(µi)
)
D10
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
]
x∗i
=
D10x
∗
i
r−µi
+
[(
1−
1
β1(µi)
)
D10
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
]
x∗i
=
D10x
∗
i
r−µ
i
−
1
β1(µ
i
)
D10x
∗
i
r−µ
i
= L˜i(x
∗
i ;µi).
To prove the smooth–pasting condition at x∗i requires a bit more work. Firstly, we observe that L˜′i(x∗i ;µi) =
0 by construction. The next lemma shows that there exists a unique value x∗i , which satisfies Lˆ′i(x∗i ;µi) = 0.14
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Figure 3 Typical leader and follower value functions.
Lemma 2 If D10−D11
D10
> 1
β1(µi
)
, then there exists one, and only one, value x∗i that solves Lˆ′i(x∗i ;µi) = 0 on
(0, xFj ].
The proof of this lemma is reported in Appendix A.
Remark 1 The leader value function Li is always concave on [0, xFj ] even if the worst case changes at
some point. We prove this fact in Appendix B.
Figure 3 shows a typical run of the leader and follower value functions, where we assume that κ1 and κ2
are such that
1
β1(µ1)
<
D10−D11
D10
<
1
β1(µ2)
.
We observe that the leader value of firm 1 drops below its follower value if xt is close to xF2 . The reason for
that is that xF1 and xF2 are unequal (in the illustrated case we have xF2 <xF1 ).
3.4. Optimal Leader Threshold
Next we want to determine the optimal time to invest as a leader. We focus (without loss of generality) on
firm 1, for reasons that will become clear in the next section. If firm 1 knows that it will not be preempted
by firm 2, it will determine its investment time by solving the optimal stopping problem
L∗1(xt) = sup
τ t
L,1
≥t
inf
Q∈PΘ1
EQ
[∫ τ tL,1
t
e−r(s−t)D00Xsds+
∫ τF2
τ t
L,i
e−r(s−t)D10Xsds
+
∫ ∞
τF2
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds− e
−r(τ tL,1−t)I1
∣∣∣Ft
]
.
(19)
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Again, in order to determine this stopping time, we cannot apply the standard procedure. Nevertheless, the
investment trigger does not differ from the one of a non–ambiguous firm faced with drift µ
1
.
Proposition 1 The optimal time to invest for firm 1 is given by τ tL,1 = inf{s≥ t|Xs ≥ xL1 }, where
xL1 =
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)− 1
r−µ
1
D10−D00
I1.
For the proof we refer to Appendix C.
As in the case without ambiguity, the optimal leader threshold is independent of the follower threshold.
Our assumption that D10 −D00 > D11 −D01 guarantees that xL1 < xF1 and, thus, that the firm wants to
become leader before it wants to become follower. This assumption therefore ensures that this is a market
characterised by preemption rather than attrition.
4. Equilibrium Analysis
The appropriate equilibrium concept for a game with ambiguity as described here is not immediately clear.
We obtain our equilibrium results by using techniques developed in Riedel and Steg (2017). It should
be pointed out that we cannot simply adopt their strategies to our setting. In fact, the notion of extended
mixed strategy as introduced in Riedel and Steg (2017) presents a conceptual problem here. Such strategies
consist, in essence, of a distribution over stopping times and an “investment intensity”. The latter component
acts as a coordination device. In our model we also need this coordination device, but we do not want
ambiguity to extend to the uncertainty created by it. This presents problems if we want to define payoffs
to an ambiguous firm if it plays a mixture over stopping times. For equilibrium existence, however, such
mixtures are not needed, so we choose to restrict attention to what we call extended pure strategies, which
consist of a stopping time and an element related to the coordination mechanism mentioned above. Once
we have restricted ourselves to such extended pure strategies, we can refer to equilibrium results obtained
by Riedel and Steg (2017) and Steg (2015). Their results mainly carry over to our framework because
ambiguity is now about payoff functions only and not about strategies. In other words, there is ambiguity
about when decisions are taken, but not about what decisions are taken at those times. We give a detailed
description of the equilibrium concept in Appendix D.
To make comparisons with existing models easier, we will assume that κ1 = κ2 ≡ κ and that I2 ≥ I1.
This essentially reduces our model to an extension of Steg (2015, Section 4.1) and Pawlina and Kort (2006).
Note that, under these assumptions it holds that xF1 ≤ xF2 . Due to our definition of strategies, most of the
results obtained by Steg (2015, Section 4.1) carry over to our setting. In particular, we have that:
Proposition 2 If I1 < I2, then L1−F1 >L2−F2 on (0, xF2 ).16
This result is similar to Steg (2015, Lemma 3.2). However, his proof relies on the linearity of the expectation
operator. In the case where P∗L,i = P
∗
F,i = P
−κ
, Steg’s result therefore applies trivially. If P∗L,i 6= P
−κ
,
however, the leader value is a (non–linear) g–expectation. The result still holds though.
Proof. On [xF1 , xF2 ) the result is obvious. For i=1,2, define the process ξLi by
ξLi,t :=
∫ τFj
t
e−r(s−t) (D10Xs− rIi)ds+
∫ ∞
τF
j
e−r(s−t) (D11Xs− rIi)ds.
We then have the following inequality for any xt <xF1 :
L1(xt)−L2(xt) = inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ[ξL1,t|Ft]− infQ∈PΘ
EQ[ξL2,t|Ft]
=EP
∗
L,1 [ξL1,t|Ft]−E
P∗L,2 [ξL2,t|Ft]
≥EP
∗
L,1 [ξL1,t|Ft]−E
P∗L,1 [ξL2,t|Ft]
=EP
∗
L,1 [ξL1,t− ξ
L
2,t|Ft]
≥ inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ[ξL1,t− ξL2,t|Ft]
(∗)
= inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[∫ τF1
t
e−r(s−t)r(I2− I1)ds+ e
−rτF1
(
L1(x
F
1 )−L2(x
F
1 )
) ∣∣∣Ft
]
, (20)
where (∗) follows from the time consistency property of a strongly rectangular set of priors. Note that the
assumption Θ1 =Θ2 is crucial here.
The operator (20) can be written as a g–expectation with generator
g˜(y, z) =−κ|z| − ry+ r(I2− I1),
so that we get
L1(xt)−L2(xt)≥Eg˜
[
e−rτ
F
1
(
L1(x
F
1 )−L2(x
F
1 )
) ∣∣∣Ft] .
Now define the generator
g(y, z) =−κ|z| − ry.
Since g˜ > g and L1(xF1 )−L2(xF1 )>F1(xF1 )−F2(xF1 ), it follows from the comparison theorem for BSDEs
(Peng (2013, Theorem 2)) that
Eg˜
[
e−rτ
F
1
(
L1(x
F
1 )−L2(x
F
1 )
) ∣∣∣Ft]>Eg [e−rτF1 (F1(xF1 )−F2(xF1 )) ∣∣∣Ft] .
It is straightforward to verify that, for the generator g, the worst–case drift is always given by µ. Therefore,
Eg
[
e−rτ
F
1
(
F1(x
F
1 )−F2(x
F
1 )
) ∣∣∣Ft]=EP−κ [e−rτF1 (F1(xF1 )−F2(xF1 )) ∣∣∣Ft]=F1(xt)−F2(xt),
which proves the result.
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We define the preemption region as the part of the state space where both firms prefer to be the leader
rather than the follower, i.e.
P = {x∈R+|(L1(x)−F1(x))∧ (L2(x)−F2(x))> 0}.
The first hitting time of P is denoted by τP . From Lemma 2 and Steg (2015, Proposition 4.1) it now
immediately follows that
P = {x∈R+|L2(x)−F2(x)> 0}= (x,x),
for some 0<x≤ x≤ xF2 . Note that it is possible that x= x and, thus, that P = ∅.
The following result immediately follows from the observation that firm 2’s leader value (under P∗L,2) is,
by definition, no larger than its leader value under P−κ.
Lemma 3 If firm 2 evaluates its leader and follower values under P∗L,2 and P∗F,2, respectively, then the
preemption region is always contained in the preemption region that results from their valuations under
P−κ.
This lemma shows that our model with ambiguity is not isomorphic to a model without ambiguity and the
unique prior P−κ. In fact, ambiguity reduces preemptive pressure.
In the literature there are typically two types of equilibria analyzed: preemptive equilibria in which firms
try to preempt each other at some times where it is sub–optimal to invest, and sequential equilibria, where
one firm invests at its optimal time. In our setting, the question which of these two types of equilibrium
prevails boils down to comparing the location of the optimal leader threshold xL1 in relation to the preemp-
tion region (
¯
x, x¯). Roughly speaking, a preemptive equilibrium arises if xL1 ∈ (¯x, x¯), whereas a sequential
equilibrium arises when xL1 ≤ ¯x.
Steg (2015), however, notes that another equilibrium scenario is possible. For certain underlying param-
eters, it may be the case that xL1 > x¯. In our model, it then holds that if x¯ < x0 < xF2 , firm 2 will not
immediately invest. That gives firm 1 the option to wait a bit longer. In fact, firm 1 solves the following
optimal stopping problem to determine when to invest:
sup
τ≤τP∧τ
F
2
inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[∫ ∞
τ
e−rs(Xs(D10−D00)− rI1)ds
]
. (21)
Since τL1 (the first hitting time of xL1 ) is the solution to the unconstrained leader problem (19), the stopping
region of the constrained problem (21) must contain the interval [xL1 , xF2 ]. This implies that the continuation
region of (21) lies entirely in the region where µ is the worst–case drift. Therefore, Steg (2015, Propo-
sition 4.2) applies, which states that, assuming that 0 < x¯(D10 −D00) < rI1, the continuation region of
problem (21) is (x¯, xˆ∧xF2 ), where xˆ∈ [rI1/(D10−D00), xL1 ) is the unique solution to the equation
(β1(µ)− 1)A(x)x
β1(µ)+(β2(µ)− 1)B(x)x
β2(µ) = I1, (22)18
where 
A(x)
B(x)

= 1
x¯β1(µ)xβ2(µ)−xβ1(µ)x¯β2(µ)

xβ2(µ)− x¯β2(µ)
−xβ1(µ)x¯β2(µ)



x¯D10−D00r−µ − I1
xD10−D00
r−µ
− I1

 .
That is, the threshold xˆ is determined in the standard way, by applying the value–matching and smooth–
pasting optimality conditions.
If it holds that x¯(D10−D00)≥ rI1, then firm 1 will always invest immediately in the region (x¯, xF2 ) and
we can set xˆ= x¯. In either case, firm 1 invests at the first hitting time, τˆ , of the set
A= (
¯
x, x¯)∪ [xˆ,∞)∪ [xF2 ,∞).
If x¯ or xˆ is hit before xF2 , then firm 1 becomes the leader, whereas if xF2 is hit first both firms invest at the
same time. However, since M1(xF2 ) =L1(xF2 ), we can say that firm 1 earns the leader payoff at τˆ , no matter
which threshold is reached first.
In the case where µ is not always the worst–case drift, the above scenario is more likely to occur than in
the case where µ is always the worst–case drift (cf. Lemma 3). Since the preemption region (
¯
x, x¯) under
P∗L,2 and P
∗
F,2 is a subset of the same set under P
−κ
, and because xL1 is the same under P
∗
L,1 and P
−κ
, it
follows that the condition x¯ < xL1 is more easily met under the worst–case priors than under P
−κ
.
To summarize, depending on the starting point x0 of the underlying stochastic process, different invest-
ment scenarios along the equilibrium path are now possible (see Appendix D for a formal statement of the
subgame perfect equilibrium):
Case 1(a). x0 <
¯
x and
¯
x≤ xL1 ≤ x¯: preemptive equilibrium where firm 1 becomes the leader at time τP
and firm 2 follows at τF2 ;
Case 1(b). x0 <
¯
x and xLi < ¯x: sequential equilibrium with firm 1 investing at time τ
L
1 and firm 2 follow-
ing at τF2 ;
Case 2.
¯
x < x0 ≤ x¯: preemptive equilibrium with at least one firm investing immediately, and where
preemption results in rent equalization;
Case 3(a). x¯ < x0 <xF2 and xL1 ≤ x¯: firm 1 becomes the leader immediately and firm 2 follows at τF2 ;
Case 3(b). x¯ < x0 <xF2 and x¯ < xL1 <xF2 : firm 1 becomes the leader at time τˆ and firm 2 follows at τF2 ;
Case 4. x0 ≥ xF2 : simultaneous investment by both firms.
5. Numerical Examples
In this section, we study numerically how the presence of ambiguity affects the equilibrium scenarios pre-
sented in the previous section. We continue to assume that Θ1 =Θ2, and that I2 > I1. Throughout, we will
use a base–case scenario, with parameter values as in Table 1. Note that this is a so–called “new market
model” (D00 =D01) so that firm 1 always invests immediately in the region (x¯, xF2 ), i.e. Case 3(b) does not19
D10 = 1.8 D11 =1 D00 = 0
D01 =0 I1 =100 I2 = 120
r= 0.1 µ=0.04 σ= 0.1
Table 1 Parameter values for a base–case numerical example.
arise (cf. Steg (2015)). In the remainder, we shall denote the value function of firm i under the equilibrium
scenario following from Section 4 by x0 7→ Vi(x0).
The presence of ambiguity changes the drift under which the firms evaluate their payoffs. In the standard
model without ambiguity a reduction in the trend µ reduces firm 1’s leader threshold xL1 and increases
firm 2’s preemption threshold
¯
x. Typically, a reduction in µ also shifts the preemption region (
¯
x, x¯), as can
be seen from Figure 4.
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Figure 4 Preemption regions for different values of µ and no ambiguity (κ=0). Other parameter values are taken from Table 1.
This insight also applies to cases where µ is always the worst–case drift (P∗L,i=P−κ), i.e. when
D10−D11
D10
≤
1
β1(µ)
.
For this case, the analysis of equilibria and firm values can proceed as if the firms use a unique prior, i.e., a
GBM with trend µ= µ−κσ.
The situation is different when
D10−D11
D10
>
1
β1(µ)
.
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In this case, firm i uses the worst–case prior P∗L,i 6= P
−κ to value the leader role, which is generated by θ∗i
with
θ∗i,t =−κ on
{
Xt ∈ [0, x
∗
i ]∪ [x
F
j ,∞)
}
and θ∗i,t =+κ on
{
Xt ∈ (x
∗
i , x
F
j )
}
.
Since I2 > I1, it holds that xF2 >xF1 and, thus, that x∗2 6= x∗1. This implies that the two firms will use different
priors to value the leader payoff on
{
θ∗1,t 6= θ
∗
2,t
}
, which is a P–non–null set. This happens even though the
firms are entirely symmetric, bar the sunk costs of investment.
This observation has some consequences for equilibria. First, the preemption region is different from
the one under the prior P−κ (cf. Lemma 3). This can be seen in Figure 5. For κ = 0.25 and κ = 0.5 the
worst–case drift for the leader payoff is not always given by µ. It can be seen that the preemption region
under P∗L,2 is then a subset of the preemption region that would be obtained if firm 2 were to use the prior
P−κ to value the leader role.
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Figure 5 Preemption regions for different values of κ under the priors P∗L,2 (solid line) and P−κ (dashed line). Other parameter
values are taken from Table 1.
Qualitatively, equilibria may or may not change as κ increases. This can be seen from Figure 6. In
Figure 6a we plot L2−F2 for κ=0 and κ= 0.25. In both cases it holds that
¯
x< xL1 , so that first investment
takes place at the first hitting time of the set [
¯
x,∞). To be more specific:
1. simultaneous investment takes place for x0 ∈ [xF2 ,∞),21
2. firm 1 immediately becomes the leader for x0 ∈ (x¯, xF2 ) (with firm 2 following at τF2 ),
3. firms immediately compete for the leader role if x0 ∈ (
¯
x, x¯), resulting in rent equalization, and
4. firm 1 becomes the leader at τP for x0 ≤
¯
x.
Firm values in this equilibrium are given by
V1(xt) =


D00xt
r−µ
+
(
xt
¯
x
)β1(µ) [
L1(
¯
x)− D00¯x
r−µ
]
if xt ≤
¯
x
F1(xt) if
¯
x<xt < x¯
L1(xt) if x¯≤ xt <xF2
M1(xt) if xt ≥ xF2 ,
and
V2(xt) =


D00xt
r−µ
+
(
xt
¯
x
)β1(µ) [
F2(
¯
x)− D00¯x
r−µ
]
if xt ≤
¯
x
F2(xt) if
¯
x< xt <x
F
2
M2(xt) if xt ≥ xF2 .
Figure 7a shows that the increase in ambiguity lowers equilibrium value for both firms. The first (downward)
jump in the value of firm 1 occurs at
¯
x. At that point, firm 1 no longer expects to earn the leader value, but
the follower value instead, due to preemptive pressure. Between x¯ and xF2 , firm 1 expects to become the
leader again, which explains the second (upward) jump in its equilibrium value function.
4 6 8 10 12 14
x
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
L
2
-
F
2
L2-F2 (κ=0)
x1
L
 (κ=0)
L2-F2 (κ=0.25)
x1
L
 (κ=0.25)
(a) κ∈ {0,0.25}
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Figure 6 Preemption regions for different values of κ under the priors P∗L,2 (solid line) and P−κ (dashed line). Other parameter
values are taken from Table 1. Also indicated are the leader thresholds for firm 1, xL1 .
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If we now add the case where κ=0.5, we can see from Figure 6b that here it no longer holds that
¯
x< xL1 .
Instead, a sequential equilibrium arises with equilibrium firm values
V1(xt) =


D00xt
r−µ
+
(
xt
xL1
)β1(µ) [
L1(x
L
1 )−
D00x
L
1
r−µ
]
if xt <xL1
L1(xt) if xL1 ≤ xt <xF2
M1(xt) if xt ≥ xF2 ,
and
V2(xt) =


D00xt
r−µ
+
(
xt
xL1
)β1(µ) [
F2(x
L
1 )−
D00x
L
1
r−µ
]
if xt <xL1
F2(xt) if xL1 ≤ xt <xF2
M2(xt) if xt ≥ xF2 .
Figure 7b shows that, for firm 2, this change in equilibrium scenario does not change anything qualitatively:
an increase in ambiguity leads to a reduction in equilibrium firm value. For firm 1, however, the story is
now different. In fact, there exists a region where firm 1 has a higher value with higher ambiguity. This
happens because in the higher ambiguity case (κ= 0.5), firm 1 always becomes the leader, whereas in the
lower ambiguity case (κ=0.25), firm 1 expects the (lower) follower value, due to preemptive pressure and
rent equalization.
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Figure 7 Equilibrium firm values (black for firm 1 and gray for firm 2) for different values of κ. Other parameter values are
taken from Table 1.
Another comparative statics exercise of interest is comparing the payoffs of an ambiguous firm with the
payoffs of an unambiguous firm. This exercise is relevant, e.g., in cases where one firm is an incumbent
who has learned the distribution of future revenues, whereas the other firm may be an entrant which has
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no information about its revenue distribution. A question that then arises is whether the unambiguous firm
benefits from its competitor’s ambiguity aversion. The intuition here is clear: yes. The ambiguity–averse
competitor has a higher value of waiting and will be willing to invest later. So, even if the firms are com-
pletely symmetric except for their attitudes to ambiguity, the non-ambiguous firm is always expecting to
become the leader, either under preemptive pressure, or at its optimal time. To illustrate this phenomenon,
we use the same numerical example as before, with I1 = I2 and 0 = κ1 < κ2. In that case the equilibrium
result is as before (because xF1 < xF2 and xL1 <xF2 ) and the only determinant of which equilibrium prevails
is the ordering of xL1 and x, and the ordering of xF1 and x. The results are shown in Figure 8. Note that
for the case κ2 = 0 both firms’ values are the same. The value for the non–ambiguous firm is increasing in
the level of ambiguity of the ambiguous firm. This is particularly stark for cases where ambiguity leads to
a situation where xL1 < x (as is the case for κ2 = 0.3) so that firm 1 can essentially ignore the preemptive
pressure exerted by firm 2.
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Figure 8 Equilibrium firm values (black for firm 1 and gray for firm 2) for different values of κ2. Other parameter values are
taken from Table 1, with I2 = I1 = 100 and κ1 = 0. The non–ambiguous firm uses the reference measure (i.e. trend
µ).
6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have built a model of an investment game with a first–mover advantage between two
firms, at least one of which is ambiguous about the probability measure over the sample paths of future
revenues. Our main conclusions are that: (i) the worst–case drift for the leader value can switch between µ
and µ, (ii) despite the complicated g-expectation under which the leader value has to be computed in those
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cases, equilibrium existence results from the literature on non–ambiguous investment mainly carry over,
and (iii) ambiguity reduces preemptive pressure, when compared to a simple reduction of the trend in a
non–ambiguous model. In this section we will further discuss some of our modeling assumptions and point
to some avenues for future research.
Our main assumptions fall into two categories: payoff and ambiguity assumptions. The payoff assump-
tions are standard in the real options literature. In particular, the multiplicative nature of the way uncertainty
enters revenues is well–established. The zero (operating) cost assumption can easily be relaxed to the case
of a deterministic cost flow, in which case the present value of operating costs can be subsumed in the
sunk costs of investment. Note that all our Dkℓs are non–negative. This restriction is required in our model,
because for negative payoff streams, the worst–case prior is always opposite to the one with positive Dkℓs.
In other words, in a model with ambiguity, gains and losses are evaluated under different priors. We want
to rule out this complication.
The assumption D10−D00 >D11−D01 is standard and reflects the first–mover advantage that we have
analysed in this paper. The assumption ensures that xLi < xFi so that no firm would prefer to become the
follower before it prefers to become the leader. The assumption is strong in the sense that the market can
never exhibit a second–mover advantage. For a model with interchanging first–mover and second–mover
advantages, see Steg and Thijssen (2015). Their model has a two–dimensional state–space, however, which
increases the technical complexity of the model substantially.
Regarding ambiguity, the assumption of κ–ambiguity is a strong one, albeit one that is often made in the
continuous–time literature. While its main technical advantage is to parameterize a strongly rectangular set
of priors, it also implies that the density generator satisfies θt ∈ [−κ,κ], regardless of the time t. Therefore,
there is no possibility of learning about the true measure in our model. A way to interpret this assumption
is given by Chen and Epstein (2002) and Epstein and Schneider (2010) and is best explained in discrete
time by means of a sequence of draws from an Ellsberg urn. In a model with learning the decision–maker
repeatedly draws balls (with replacement) from the same Ellsberg urn, thereby having the opportunity to
shrink the set of priors over time. A model without learning, like ours, is appropriate when the decision–
maker draws from a different Ellsberg urn every time. This prevents the decision–maker from learning
about ambiguity. Suppose that the process X represents the (market) demand flow for the firm’s product. If
the manager thinks that the expected growth rate might not be constant over time then our model without
learning is appropriate. For example, X may represent market demand, the expected growth rate of which
may vary over time due to changing consumer tastes. It might then be better for the manager to consider an
interval of trends and apply a precautionary principle in valuation. If the manager beliefs that the expected
growth rate of demand is constant and learnable through observations of actual demand, then a model with
learning is more appropriate.
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If our model were extended to include learning, we would expect the interval [µ,µ] to shrink over time.
Essentially, such a model would be an extension to ambiguity of the model analysed in De´camps et al.
(2005). Of course, it can not be predicted ex ante in which direction the interval will shrink. For example,
if the true measure is P−κ then, over time, the highest possible trend will reduce. This has no effect on
firm values in the case where µ always represents the worst–case drift. It will, however, increase the leader
value in the case where µ is not always the worst–case drift. This, in turn should lead to a widening of the
preemption region and, thus, to earlier investment. If the true probability measure is some P 6∈ {P−κ,P+κ},
one would expect that, over time, both µ and µ will move closer together. This will increase both leader and
follower values and will decrease the leader and follower thresholds. The effect on the preemption region
and resulting equilibria is unclear and will be left for future research.
To the best of our knowledge, there have been no empirical studies into the effects of risk aversion
or ambiguity on corporate investment timing decisions. In a real options model, risk aversion leads to
delay of investment (see, e.g., Thijssen (2010)). In that sense, our theory leads to the same qualitative
conclusion: ambiguity leads to a further delay of investment. This opens up the possibility of empirical
research into ambiguity over (competitive) growth options, much in the same way as in the literature on
the equity premium puzzle. As Mehra and Prescott (1985) have famously shown, in the standard expected
utility theory of asset pricing empirically observed equity premia are compatible only with implausibly
large coefficients of risk aversion. Trojani and Vanini (2004) have shown that a model with an ambiguity
averse representative investor leads to higher risk premia and lower interest rates, thus providing a (partial)
explanation of the equity premium puzzle. Our model could be used in a similar way. If it were the case that
empirically observed investment timing in oligopolistic industries requires implausibly large coefficients of
risk aversion, then ambiguity aversion may explain the observed behavior.
Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 2
In this section, we show that if the worst–case for the leader value is not always given by the worst possible
trend, there exists a unique value x∗i at which the worst–case drift changes from µi to µi. As before, we
drop subscripts wherever possible.
Proof. The critical value x∗i is found by applying the smooth–pasting condition Lˆi(x∗i ;µi) = 0. The first
derivative of Lˆi is given by
Lˆ′i(x;µi) =
D10
r−µi
+
β1(µi)(x
∗
i )
β2(µi)xβ1(µi)−1−β2(µi)(x
∗
i )
β1(µi)xβ2(µi)−1
(x∗i )
β2(µi)(xFj )
β1(µi)− (x∗i )
β1(µi)(xFj )
β2(µi)
(
D11
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
)
xFj
+
β2(µi)(x
F
j )
β1(µi)xβ2(µi)−1−β1(µi)(x
F
j )
β2(µi)xβ1(µi)−1
(x∗i )
β2(µi)(xFj )
β1(µi)− (x∗i )
β1(µi)(xFj )
β2(µi)
[(
1−
1
β1(µ
i
)
)
D10
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
]
x∗i .
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In order to prove the existence of x∗i , we will show that if x∗i ↑ xFj , Lˆ′i(x∗i ;µi) becomes negative, and if
x∗i ↓ 0, Lˆ
′
i(x
∗
i ;µi) becomes positive.
We have
Lˆ′i(x
∗
i ;µi) =
D10
r−µi
+
(β1(µi)−β2(µi))(x
∗
i )
β1(µi)+β2(µi)−1
(x∗i )
β2(µi)(xFj )
β1(µi)− (x∗i )
β1(µi)(xFj )
β2(µi)
(
D11
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
)
xFj
+
β2(µi)(x
F
j )
β1(µi)(x∗i )
β2(µi)−β1(µi)(x
F
j )
β2(µi)(x∗i )
β1(µi)
(x∗i )
β2(µi)(xFj )
β1(µi)− (x∗i )
β1(µi)(xFj )
β2(µi)
[(
1−
1
β1(µ
i
)
)
D10
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
]
.
Clearly, limx∗
i
↓xF
j
Lˆ′i(x
∗
i , µi) has the same sign as
D10
r−µi
(
(xFj )
β2(µi)(xFj )
β1(µi)− (xFj )
β1(µi)(xFj )
β2(µi)
)
+(β1(µi)−β2(µi)) (x
F
j )
β1(µi)+β2(µi)
[
D11
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
−
(
1−
1
β1(µ
i
)
)
D10
r−µ
i
+
D10
r−µi
]
.
(23)
Using the fact that 1
β1(µi)
< D10−D11
D10
yields that (23) is smaller than
(β1(µi)−β2(µi)) (x
F
j )
β1(µi)+β2(µi)
1
r−µ
i
(D11−D10+D10−D11) = 0. (24)
Considering the case x∗i ↓ 0, one can easily see that limx∗i ↓0 Lˆ
′
i(x
∗
i ;µi) has the same sign as
lim
x∗
i
↓0
{
D10
r−µi
(
(x∗i )
β2(µi)(xFj )
β1(µi)− (x∗i )
β1(µi)(xFj )
β2(µi)
)
+(β1(µi)−β2(µi)) (x
∗
i )
β1(µi)+β2(µi)−1
(
D11
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
)
xFj
+β2(µi)(x
F
j )
β1(µi)(x∗i )
β2(µi)−β1(µi)(x
F
j )
β2(µi)(x∗i )
β1(µi)
((
1−
1
β1(µ
i
)
)
D10
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
)}
= lim
x∗
i
↓0
{
(x∗i )
β2(µi)
(
D10
r−µi
(
(xFj )
β2(µi)− (x∗i )
β1(µi)−β2(µi)
)
+(β1(µi)−β2(µi))(x
∗
i )
β1(µi)−1
(
D11
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
)
xFj
+
(
β2(µi)(x
F
j )
β1(µi)−β1(µi)(x
∗
i )
β1(µi)−β2(µi)(xFj )
β2(µi)
)((
1−
1
β1(µi)
)
D10
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
))}
= lim
x∗
i
↓0
(x∗i )
β2(µi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
→+∞
{
D10
r−µi︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0

(xFj )β2(µi)− (x∗i )β1(µi)−β2(µi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
→0


+(β1(µi)−β2(µi))(x
∗
i )
β1(µi)−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
→0
(
D11
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
)
xFj
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+
β2(µi)(xFj )β1(µi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
−β1(µi)(x
∗
i )
β1(µi)−β2(µi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
→0


((
1−
1
β1(µi)
)
D10
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
}
.
Therefore, we get Lˆ′i(x∗i ;µi)> 0 for x∗i close to 0. Due to continuity of L′j on [0, xFj ], we can find in that
interval a solution to Lˆ′i(x∗i ;µi) = 0.
The uniqueness of x∗i is automatically given by the uniqueness of the solution to PDE (15).
B. Concavity of Li
In this section we prove that the leader value function is concave on [0, xFj ] . In case the worst–case prior is
always induced by the lowest possible trend, this statement is trivial. The next proof shows that concavity
is not lost even if the worst–case changes at some point.
Proof. Suppose condition (9) is not satisfied (i.e. P∗L,i 6=P−κi). The concavity of Li(x) for x< x∗i is trivial.
We therefore consider the second derivative of Li on the interval [x∗i , xFj ):
Lˆ′′i (x;µi) =
β1(µi)(β1(µi)− 1)(x
∗
i )
β2(µi)xβ1(µi)−2−β2(µi)(β2(µi)− 1)(x
∗
i )
β1(µi)xβ2(µi)−2
(x∗i )
β2(µi)(xFj )
β1(µi)− (x∗i )
β1(µi)(xFj )
β2(µi)
×
(
D11
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
)
xFj
+
β2(µi)(β2(µi)− 1)(x
F
j )
β1(µi)xβ2(µi)−2−β1(µi)(β1(µi)− 1)(x
F
j )
β2(µi)xβ1(µi)−2
(x∗i )
β2(µi)(xFj )
β1(µi)− (x∗i )
β1(µi)(xFj )
β2(µi)
×
[(
1−
1
β1(µi)
)
D10
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
]
x∗i .
Now, we have
β1(µi)(β1(µi)− 1)x
β1(µi)−2
[(
D11
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
)
xFj (x
∗
i )
β2(µi)
−
((
1−
1
β1(µi)
)
D10
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
)
x∗i (x
F
j )
β2(µi)
]
<β1(µi)(β1(µi)− 1)x
β1(µi)−2x∗i (x
F
j )
β2(µi)
[(
D11
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
)
−
((
1−
1
β1(µi)
)
D10
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
)]
= β1(µi)(β1(µi)− 1)x
β1(µi)−2x∗i (x
F
j )
β2(µi)
[
D11
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µ
i
+
1
β1(µi)
D10
r−µ
i
]
<β1(µi)(β1(µi)− 1)x
β1(µi)−2x∗i (x
F
j )
β2(µi)
1
r−µ
i
[D11−D10+D10−D11]
= 0,
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where we used the fact that x∗i (xFj )β2(µi) < (x∗i )β2(µi)(xFj ) (because x∗i < xFj and β2(µi) < 0) and
D10−D11
D10
> 1
β1(µi
)
.
In a similar, way we can show that
β2(µi)(β2(µi)− 1)x
β2(µi)−2
[
−
(
D11
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
)
xFj (x
∗
i )
β1(µi)
+
((
1−
1
β1(µi)
)
D10
r−µ
i
−
D10
r−µi
)
x∗i (x
F
j )
β1(µi)
]
< 0,
which proves the concavity of Li.
C. Proof of Proposition 1
The proof follows along similar lines to the proof of Theorem 1. We use the same procedure, but now we
consider the value function in the continuation region, i.e. before any investment has taken place. Applying
the BSDE approach with different value–matching and smooth–pasting conditions eventually yields the
desired stopping time.
Proof. Denote
Yt = inf
Q∈PΘ1
EQ
[∫ τ tL,1
t
e−r(s−t)D00Xsds+
∫ τF2
τ t
L,1
e−r(s−t)(D10Xs− rI1)ds
+
∫ ∞
τF2
e−r(s−t)(D11Xs− rI1)ds
∣∣∣Ft].
Using the time–consistency property of a strongly–rectangular set of density generators yields
Yt = inf
Q∈PΘ1
EQ
[∫ τ tL,1
t
e−r(s−t)D00Xsds+
∫ τF2
τ t
L,1
e−r(s−t)(D10Xs− rI1)ds
+
∫ ∞
τF2
e−r(s−t)(D11Xs− rI1)ds
∣∣∣Ft]
= inf
Q∈PΘ1
EQ
[
inf
Q′∈PΘ
EQ
′
[∫ τ tL,1
t
e−r(s−t)D00Xsds+
∫ τF2
τ t
L,1
e−r(s−t)(D10Xs− rI1)ds
+
∫ ∞
τF2
e−r(s−t)(D11Xs− rI1)ds
∣∣∣Fτ t
L,1
]∣∣∣Ft
]
= inf
Q∈PΘ1
EQ
[∫ τ tL,1
t
e−r(s−t)D00Xsds+ e
−r(τ tL,1−t) inf
Q′∈PΘ1
EQ
′
[∫ τF2
τ t
L,1
e−r(s−τ
t
L,1)(D10Xs− rI1)ds
+
∫ ∞
τF2
e−r(s−τ
t
L,1)(D11Xs− rI1)ds
∣∣∣Fτ t
L,1
]∣∣∣Ft
]
= inf
Q∈PΘ1
EQ
[∫ τ tL,1
t
e−r(s−t)D00Xsds+ e
−r(τ tL,1−t)L1(xτ t
L,1
)
∣∣∣Ft
]
.
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Following Chen and Epstein (2002), Yt solves the BSDE
−dYt= g1(Zt)dt−ZtdBt,
where the generator is given by
g1(z) =−κ1|z| − rYt+XtD00.
The boundary condition is given by
Yτ t
L,1
=L1(x
L
1 ),
where L1(xL1 ) is given by Theorem 1 and xL1 = xτ tL,1 .
Denote the present value of the leader payoff by Λ, i.e.
Λ(xt) = Yt.
The non–linear Feynman–Kac formula implies that Λ solves the non–linear PDE
LXΛ(x)+ g1(σxΛ
′(x)) = 0.
Hence, Λ solves
1
2
σ2x2Λ′′(x)+µxΛ′(x)−κ1σx |Λ
′(x)|− rΛ(x)+D00x=0. (25)
In the continuation region the leader function has to be increasing, hence Λ′ > 0. This implies that µ
1
is the
worst–case in the continuation region.
Therefore, equation (25) becomes
1
2
σ2x2Λ′′(x)+ (µ−κ1σ)xΛ
′(x)− rΛ(x)+D00x=
1
2
σ2x2Λ′′(x)+µ
1
xΛ′(x)− rΛ(x)+D00x= 0.
The general increasing solution to this PDE is
Λ(x) =
D00x
r−µ
1
+A2x
β1(µ1).
We have to distinguish two cases here. Either the condition given in Theorem 1 holds which means that
the boundary condition takes the form (10) or the boundary condition becomes (11).
We will show that for both cases, the optimal threshold to invest becomes
xL1 =
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)− 1
I1(r−µ1)
D10−D00
. (26)
If condition (9) is satisfied, the boundary condition is given by
L1(x
L
1 ) =
D10x
L
1
r−µ
1
+
(
xL1
xF2
)β1(µ1) D11−D10
r−µ
1
xF2 − I1.
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Otherwise, the boundary condition is given by
L1(x
L
1 ) =
D10x
L
1
r−µ
1
−
1
β1(µ1)
D10x
∗
1
r−µ
1
(
xL1
x∗1
)β1(µ1)
− I1.
In addition to the value–matching condition, we apply a smooth–pasting condition. Here, smooth pasting
implies that the derivatives of the value function Λ and L coincide at xτ t
L,1
, i.e.
Λ′(xτ t
L,1
) =L′1(xτ t
L,1
). (27)
This condition ensures differentiability at the investment threshold.
Applying condition (27) gives
D00
r−µ
1
+β1(µ1)A2x
L
1
β1(µ1
)−1
=
D10
r−µ
1
+β1(µ1)A1x
L
1
β1(µ1
)−1
,
where
A1 =
(
1
xF2
)β1(µ1)−1 D11−D10
r−µ
1
in the first case and
A1 =−
1
β1(µ1)
D10x
∗
1
r−µ
1
(
1
x∗1
)β1(µ1)
in the second.
Hence,
A2 =
D10−D00
r−µ
1
1
β1(µ1)
1
xL1
β1(µ1)−1
+A1.
Applying the value–matching condition finally yields
D00x
L
1
r−µ
1
+
(
D10−D00
r−µ
1
1
β1(µ1)
1
xL1
β1(µ1
)−1
+A1
)
xL1
β1(µ1) =
D10x
L
1
r−µ
1
+A1x
L
1
β1(µ1)− I1
⇐⇒
D10−D00
r−µ
1
xL1 −
D10−D00
r−µ
1
1
β1(µ1)
xL1 = I1
⇐⇒
β1(µ1)− 1
β1(µ1)
D10−D00
r−µ
1
xL1 = I1,
and therefore, for both cases, it holds that
xL1 =
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)− 1
r−µ
1
D10−D00
I1.
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D. Equilibrium Concept
The appropriate notion of subgame–perfect equilibrium for our game is developed in Riedel and Steg
(2017). In this section we adapt their equilibrium concept to make it applicable to games with ambiguous
players.
Let T denote the set of stopping times with respect to the filtration (Ft)t≥0. The set T will act as the
set of (pure) strategies. Given the definitions of the leader, follower and simultaneous investment payoffs
above, the timing game is
Γ=
〈
(Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0 ,P), (PΘi)i=1,2,T ×T , (Li, Fi,Mi)i=1,2, (πi)i=1,2
〉
,
where, for (τ1, τ2)∈T ×T ,
πi(x0) = inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[
Li(x0)1τi<τj +Fi(x0)1τi>τj +Mi(x0)1τi=τj
]
.
The subgame starting at stopping time ϑ∈T is the tuple
Γϑ =
〈
(Ω,F , (Ft)t≥ϑ,P), (PΘi)i=1,2,Tϑ×Tϑ, (Li, Fi,Mi)i=1,2, (πϑi )i=1,2
〉
,
where Tϑ is the set of stopping times no smaller than ϑ a.s., i.e.
Tϑ := {τ ∈T |τ ≥ ϑ,P− a.s.},
and, for (τ1, τ2)∈Tϑ×Tϑ,
πϑi (xϑ) = inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[
Li(xϑ)1τi<τj +Fi(xϑ)1τi>τj +M1(xϑ)1τi=τj |Fϑ
]
.
As is argued in Riedel and Steg (2017), careful consideration has to be given to the appropriate notion of
strategy. They show that the notion of extended mixed strategy is versatile and intuitively appealing. For the
subgame Γϑ this is a pair of processes (Gϑ, αϑ), both taking values in [0,1], with the following properties.
1. Gϑ is adapted, has right–continuous and non–decreasing sample paths, with Gϑ(s) = 0 for all s < ϑ,
P–a.s.
2. αϑ is progressively measurable with right–continuous sample paths whenever its value is in (0,1),
P–a.s.
3. On {t≥ ϑ}, it holds that αϑ(t)> 0 implies Gϑ(t) = 1, P–a.s.
Note that the properties above hold for all Q ∈PΘi , i = 1,2, if they hold for P, because all measures in
PΘi are equivalent. We use the convention that
Gϑ(0−)≡ 0, Gϑ(∞)≡ 1, and αϑ(∞)≡ 1.
For our purposes extended mixed strategies are, in fact, more general than necessary. Therefore, we will
restrict attention to what we will call extended pure strategies. For the subgame Γϑ this is a pair of extended32
mixed strategies (Gϑi , αϑi )i=1,2, whereGϑi is restricted to take values in {0,1}. In other words, in an extended
pure strategy a firm does not mix over stopping times, but potentially mixes over its “investment intensity”
αϑ.
An extended pure strategy for the game Γ is then a collection (Gϑ, αϑ)ϑ∈T of extended pure strategies in
subgames Γϑ, ϑ∈T satisfying the time consistency conditions that for all ϑ, ν ∈T it holds that
1. ν ≤ t∈R+ implies Gϑ(t) =Gϑ(ν−)+ (1−Gϑ(ν−))Gν(t), P–a.s. on {ϑ≤ ν},
2. αϑ(τ) = αν(τ), P–a.s., for all τ ∈T .
The importance of the α component in the definition of extended pure strategy becomes obvious in the
definition of payoffs. Essentially α allows both for immediate investment and coordination between firms.
It leads to investment probabilities that can be thought of as the limits of conditional stage investment
probabilities of discrete–time behavioral strategies with vanishing period length (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985)). In the remainder, let τˆϑi be the first time that αϑi is strictly positive, and let τˆϑ be the first time that
at least one αϑ is non–zero in the subgame Γϑ, i.e.
τˆϑi = inf{t≥ ϑ|α
ϑ
i (t)> 0}, and τˆϑ = inf{t≥ ϑ|αϑ1 (t)+αϑ2 (t)> 0},
respectively. At time τˆϑ the extended pure strategies induce a probability measure on the state space
Λ= { {Firm 1 becomes the leader},{Firm 2 becomes the leader},{Both firms invest simultaneously} } ,
for which we will use the shorthand notation
Λ= { (L,1), (L,2),M } .
Riedel and Steg (2017) show that the probability measure on Λ, induced by the pair (αϑ1 , αϑ1 ), is given by
λϑL,i(τˆ
ϑ) =


αϑ
i,τˆϑ
(1−αϑ
j,τˆϑ
)
αϑ
i,τˆϑ
+αϑ
j,τˆϑ
−αϑ
i,τˆϑ
αϑ
j,τˆϑ
if τˆϑi = τˆϑj and αϑi (τˆϑi ), αϑj (τˆϑi )> 0
1 if τˆϑi < τˆϑj , or τˆϑi = τˆϑj and αϑj (τˆϑj ) = 0
0 if τˆϑi > τˆϑj , or τˆϑi = τˆϑj and αϑj (τˆϑj ) = 0
1
2
(
lim inft↓τˆϑ
i
αϑi (t)(1−α
ϑ
j (t))
αϑ
i
(t)+αϑ
j
(t)−αϑ
i
(t)αϑ
j
(t)
if τˆϑi = τˆϑj , αϑi (τˆϑi ) =αϑj (τˆϑj ) = 0,
+lim supt↓τˆϑ
i
αϑi (t)(1−α
ϑ
j (t))
αϑ
i
(t)+αϑ
j
(t)−αϑ
i
(t)αϑ
j
(t)
)
and αϑi (τˆϑi +), αϑj (τˆϑj +)> 0,
and
λϑM (τˆ
ϑ) =


0 if τˆϑi = τˆϑj , αϑi (τˆϑi ) = αϑj (τˆϑi ) = 0, and αϑi (τˆϑi +), αϑj (τˆϑi +)> 0
αϑ
i,τˆϑ
αϑ
j,τˆϑ
αϑ
i,τˆϑ
+αϑ
j,τˆϑ
−αϑ
i,τˆϑ
αϑ
j,τˆϑ
otherwise.
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1. If τˆϑi < τˆϑj there is no coordination problem: firm i becomes the leader λ–a.s. at τˆϑi ;
2. If τˆϑi = τˆϑj , but αϑj (τˆϑj ) = 0, there is no coordination problem: firm i becomes the leader λ–a.s. at τˆϑi ;
3. In the degenerate case where τˆϑi = τˆϑj , αϑi (τˆϑi ) = αϑj (τˆϑj ) = 0, and αϑi (τˆϑi +), αϑj (τˆϑj +)> 0, the leader
role is assigned at time τˆϑi , effectively on the basis of the flip of a fair coin;
4. Firms are not ambiguous over the measure λ.
In order to derive the payoffs to firms, let τϑG,i denote the first time that Gϑi jumps to one, i.e.
τϑG,i = inf
{
t≥ ϑ
∣∣Gϑi (t)> 0} .
The payoff to firm i of a pair of extended pure strategies ((G1, α1), (G2, α2)) in the subgame Γϑ is given
by
V ϑi
(
(Gϑi , α
ϑ
i ), (G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j )
)
: = inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[
1τϑ
G,i
<min{τϑ
G,j
,τˆϑ}
(∫ τϑG,i
ϑ
e−r(s−ϑ)D00Xsds+
∫ τFj
τϑ
G,i
e−r(s−ϑ)D10Xsds
+
∫ ∞
τF
j
e−r(s−ϑ)D11Xsds− e
−r(τϑG,i−ϑ)Ii
)∣∣∣Fϑ]
+ inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[
1τϑ
G,j
<min{τϑ
G,i
,τˆϑ}
(∫ τϑG,j
ϑ
e−r(s−ϑ)D00Xsds+
∫ τFi
τϑ
G,j
e−r(s−ϑ)D01Xsds
+
∫ ∞
τF
i
e−r(s−ϑ)D11Xs− e
−r(τFi −ϑ)Ii
)∣∣∣Fϑ]
+ inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[
1τϑ
G,i
=τϑ
G,j
<τˆϑ
(∫ τϑG,i
ϑ
e−r(s−ϑ)D00Xsds
+
∫ ∞
τϑ
G,i
e−r(s−ϑ)D11Xsds
)∣∣∣Fϑ]
+ inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[
1τˆϑ≤min{τϑ
G,i
,τϑ
G,i
}λ
ϑ
L,i(τˆ
ϑ)
(∫ τˆϑ
ϑ
e−r(s−ϑ)D00Xsds
+
∫ τFj
τˆϑ
e−r(s−ϑ)D10Xsds+
∫ ∞
τF
j
e−r(s−ϑ)D11Xsds− e
−r(τϑG,i−ϑ)Ii
)∣∣∣Fϑ
]
+ inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[
1τˆϑ≤min{τϑ
G,i
,τϑ
G,i
}λ
ϑ
L,j(τˆ
ϑ)
(∫ τˆϑ
ϑ
e−r(s−ϑ)D00Xsds
+
∫ τFi
τˆϑ
e−r(s−ϑ)D01Xsds+
∫ ∞
τF
i
e−r(s−ϑ)D11Xs− e
−r(τFi −ϑ)Ii
)∣∣∣Fϑ
]
+ inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[
1τˆϑ≤min{τϑ
G,i
,τϑ
G,i
}λ
ϑ
M (τˆ
ϑ)
(∫ τˆϑ
ϑ
e−r(s−ϑ)D00Xsds
+
∫ ∞
τˆϑ
e−r(s−ϑ)D11Xsds
)∣∣∣Fϑ].
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Hence, the payoff of firm i can written as
V ϑi
(
(Gϑi , α
ϑ
i ), (G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j )
)
:= inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[
1τϑ
G,i
<min{τϑ
G,j
,τˆϑ}Li(xϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ]
+ inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[
1τϑ
G,j
<min{τϑ
G,i
,τˆϑ}Fi(xϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ]
+ inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[
1τϑ
G,i
=τϑ
G,j
<τˆϑMi(xϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ]
+ inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[
1τˆϑ≤min{τϑ
G,i
,τϑ
G,i
}λ
ϑ
L,i(τˆ
ϑ)Li(xϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ]
+ inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[
1τˆϑ≤min{τϑ
G,i
,τϑ
G,i
}λ
ϑ
L,j(τˆ
ϑ)Fi(xϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ]
+ inf
Q∈PΘi
EQ
[
1τˆϑ≤min{τϑ
G,i
,τϑ
G,i
}λ
ϑ
M (τˆ
ϑ)Mi(xϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ] .
An equilibrium for the subgame Γϑ is a pair of extended pure strategies
(
(G¯ϑ1 , α¯
ϑ
1 ), (G¯
ϑ
2 , α¯
ϑ
2 )
)
, such that
for each firm i=1,2 and every extended pure strategy (Gϑi , αϑi ) it holds that
V ϑi (G¯
ϑ
i , α¯
ϑ
i , G¯
ϑ
j , α¯
ϑ
j )≥ V
ϑ
i (G
ϑ
i , α
ϑ
i , G¯
ϑ
j , α¯
ϑ
j ),
for j 6= i. A subgame perfect equilibrium is a pair of extended pure strategies
(
(G¯1, α¯1), (G¯2, α¯2)
)
, such
that for each ϑ∈T the pair
(
(G¯ϑ1 , α¯
ϑ
1 ), (G¯
ϑ
2 , α¯
ϑ
2 )
)
is an equilibrium in the subgame Γϑ.
For the equilibrium analysis in this paper it is important to know where Li >Fi. In a model with PΘ1 =
PΘ2 and I1 < I2 we have that (cf. Proposition 2)
L1−F1 >L2−F2, on (0, x
F
2 ).
The following equilibrium results now follow directly from Riedel and Steg (2017) and Steg (2015). The
collection (
(Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1 ), (G
ϑ
2 , α
ϑ
2 )
)
ϑ∈T
,
constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium, where
1. if xL1 ∈ (¯x, x¯), it holds that
Gϑ1 = 1{t:xt≥
¯
x}
αϑ1 (t) =


1 if xt ∈ {
¯
x}∪ [x¯,∞)
L2(xt)−F2(xt)
L2(xt)−M2(xt)
if xt ∈ (
¯
x, x¯)
0 else,
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and
Gϑ2 = 1{t:xt∈(
¯
x,x¯)∪[xF2 ,∞)}
αϑ2 (t) =


1 if xt ≥ xF2
L1(xt)−F1(xt)
L1(xt)−M1(xt)
if xt ∈ [
¯
x, x¯]
0 else;
2. if xL1 < ¯x, it holds that
Gϑ1 = α
ϑ
1 = 1{t:xt≥xL1 }
,
and
Gϑ2 = α
ϑ
2 = 1{t:t≥xF2 }
;
3. if xL1 > x¯ and x¯(D10−D00)< rI1, it holds that
Gϑ1 = 1{t:xt∈[
¯
x,x¯]∪[xˆ,∞)∪[xF2 ,∞)}
αϑ1 (t) =


1 if xt ∈ {
¯
x, x¯}∪ [xˆ,∞)∪ [xF2 ,∞)
L2(xt)−F2(xt)
L2(xt)−M2(xt)
if xt ∈ (
¯
x, x¯)
0 else,
and
Gϑ2 = 1{t:xt∈(
¯
x,x¯)∪[xF2 ,∞)}
αϑ2 (t) =


1 if xt ≥ xF2
L1(xt)−F1(xt)
L1(xt)−M1(xt)
if xt ∈ [
¯
x, x¯]
0 else.
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